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Abstract
In past work on Chinese “cosmology”, I have resisted using the term “metaphysics” be-
cause of the history of this term in classical Greek philosophy. Angus Graham has warned 
us of the equivocations that arise in eliding the distinction between Greek ontology and 
classical Chinese cosmology. In this essay, I have been inspired by my dear friend the late 
Yu Jiyuan’s distinction between classical Greek “metaphysics” and “contemporary meta-
physics with ambiguous edges” to adapt the term “metaphysics” for use within the classical 
Confucian corpus. In the language of Confucian “metaphysics”, the ultimate goal of our 
philosophical inquiry is quite literally “to know one’s way around things’” (zhidao 知道) 
in the broadest possible sense of the term “things”. In the application of Confucian met-
aphysics, “knowing” certainly begins from the cognitive understanding of a situation, but 
then goes on to include the creative and practical activity of “realizing a world” through 
ars contextualis—the art of contextualizing things. I apply the insight that “metaphysics” 
so understood in the Confucian context provides a warrant for establishing a useful con-
trast between a Greek conception of the “human being” and a Confucian conception of 
“human becomings”. 
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»Yu Jiyuan 余紀元 in obnova ‚metafizike‘ za konfucijansko filozofijo: človeško 
‚bitje‘ ali nastajanje ‚človeškosti‘?« 
Izvleček
V svojih preteklih delih, ki so obravnavala kitajsko »kozmologijo«, se je avtor izogibal rabi 
termina »metafizika«, kajti ta pojem ima v klasični grški filozofiji specifično zgodovino. 
Že Angus Graham je opozarjal na zmedo, ki lahko nastane, če ne upoštevamo razlik 
med grško ontologijo in klasično kitajsko kozmologijo. Za pisanje pričujočega članka je 
avtorja navdihnil njegov dober prijatelj, pokojni kitajski filozof Yu Jiyuan, ki je vzpostavil 
razliko med klasično grško »metafiziko« in »sodobno metafiziko z nejasnimi robovi«, da 
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bi s tem omogočil rabo termina »metafizika« znotraj klasičnega kitajskega korpusa. V 
jeziku konfucijanske »metafizike« je najvišji cilj filozofskega raziskovanja v »spoznavanju 
poti, ki vodi k stvarem« (zhidao 知道), pri čemer se izraz »stvar« razumeva v najširšem 
možnem pomenu. V okviru konfucijanske metafizike »spoznanje« izvira predvsem iz 
kognitivnega razumevanja, a v naslednjih korakih vendarle vključuje tudi ustvarjalno in 
praktično aktivnost »uresničenja oziroma dojetja sveta« preko ars contextualis, tj. umet-
nosti kontekstualizacije stvari. Avtor izhaja iz predpostavke, da nam tovrstno razumevanje 
»metafizike« v kontekstu konfucijanstva omogoča vzpostavitev koristnega kontrasta med 
grško konceptualizacijo človeka kot »človeškega bitja« in konfucijansko konceptualizacijo 
človeka v smislu »nenehnega nastajanja človeškosti«.
Ključne besede: konfucijanska metafizika, nastajanje človeškosti, Yu Jiyuan, vitalna 
relacionalnost 
An Ametaphysic Metaphysics
One assumption we might all agree upon is that a first step in reading pre-Qin 
Confucian philosophical texts that are decidedly distant from us in time and place 
is to try with imagination to locate them within their own interpretive context.1 
We might refer to the uncommon historical and intellectual assumptions that con-
stitute such an interpretive context alternatively as “persistent yet always changing 
ways of thinking and living”, or as “a different worldview”, or as “a process cos-
mology”, or as “an early Confucian metaphysics”. While the language of “ways of 
thinking and living” and “worldview” would seem to be philosophically innocent 
and hence unproblematic, the terms “cosmology” and “metaphysics”, given their 
distinctive and protean histories within our own Western cultural narrative, would 
certainly require substantial qualification. David Hall and I used “cosmology” as a 
preferred alternative to “metaphysics” in our earlier work with some considerable 
trepidation. As a consequence, we invented the rather awkward and decidedly 
unnatural neologism “acosmotic cosmology” (Hall and Ames 1998, 249). 
If we are going to use the term “metaphysics” to discuss early Confucianism, then as 
with “cosmology” we will have to begin deliberately by distinguishing whatever we 
might conceive of as Confucian “metaphysics” from the classical Greek definition of 
this same term. The distinguished scholar of classical Greek philosophy, Yu Jiyuan, 
appeals to Aristotle to explain the Greek understanding of metaphysics as first and 
foremost the study of ontology—that is, as the science of “being” qua being:
1 A good example of how the interpretive context makes a difference is the recent work by scholars 
such as David Wong, Chris Fraser, James Behuniak, Dan Robbins, Hui-chieh Loy, Ben Wong, 
and so on, who have taken on the challenge of reinstating the Mozi as integral to the intellectual 
debates that flourished in the pre-Qin period. The Zhongyong can best be interpreted as a Confucian 
argument against a possible Mohist reading of the relationship between tian and the human world. 
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The most important question of Greek metaphysics is the problem of 
being (ontology, which is usually synonymous with general metaphysics, 
means literally a theory [logos] about “onto”, the participle stem of the 
Greek verb “to be”). Aristotle has explicitly stated that the problem of be-
ing is “indeed the question which, both now and of old, has always (aei) 
been raised, and always (aei) been the subject of doubt (Meta. 1028b2-
4).” (Yu 2011, 144)
If “metaphysics” is understood in this Aristotelian sense as knowledge of the ulti-
mate and unchanging character of being per se, Confucian philosophy is resolutely 
ametaphysical (dare we say “ametaphysic”). But Yu Jiyuan quite rightly insists 
that we are free to retrofit our philosophical categories, and further allows that “in 
contemporary philosophy ‘metaphysics’ becomes a term with ambiguous edges” 
(Yu 2011, 138). In the same spirit as Yu Jiyuan then, I would argue that perhaps 
an acceptable alternative and more inclusive understanding of metaphysics in our 
own time might be something both as simple and as complex as “experience in 
its broadest perspective”. As Wilfrid Sellars has observed about the function of 
philosophy in general: 
The aim of philosophy, abstractly formulated, is to understand how things 
in the broadest possible sense of the term hang together in the broadest 
possible sense of the term. Under “things in the broadest possible sense” 
I include such radically different items as not only “cabbages and kings”, 
but numbers and duties, possibilities and finger snaps, aesthetic expe-
rience and death. To achieve success in Philosophy would be, to use a 
contemporary turn of phrase, to “know one’s way around” with respect 
to all these things, not in that unreflective way in which the centipede 
of the story knew its way around before it faced the question, “how do I 
walk?”, but in that reflective way which means that no intellectual holds 
are barred. (Sellars 1963, 1)
In this essay, I will first say something briefly about the interpretive context need-
ed for reading pre-Qin Chinese philosophy, and then I want to then try to use 
Yu Jiyuan’s distinction between classical Greek “metaphysics” and “contemporary 
metaphysics with ambiguous edges” to establish a contrast between a Greek con-
ception of the “human being” and a Confucian conception of “human becomings”. 
As we will find below, in the language of Confucian “metaphysics”, the goal of 
our philosophical inquiry, like Sellars’, will be quite literally “to know one’s way 
around things’” (zhidao 知道) in the broadest possible sense of the term “things”. 
But with respect to “knowing”, the real challenge for us, lies in understanding 
that in Confucian metaphysics, “knowing” certainly begins from the cognitive 
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understanding of a situation, but then goes on to include the creative and practical 
activity of “realizing a world” through ars contextualis—the art of contextualizing 
things. With respect to how we should understand “things” then, the Confucian 
world constituted of the “myriad things” (wanwu 萬物) refers in fact to all of the 
interdependent, dynamic events that constitute our shared experience, a shared 
experience in which we ourselves are included as active participants. In this Con-
fucian “metaphysics” then, when we ask the question “What does it mean to be 
human?” the answer is that human persons are best understood not as “things” but 
as “events in history”, not as something that we “are” but something that we “do”, 
not ontologically as “beings” per se but as human “becomings”. 
Where to Begin Our Inquiry: “Only Becoming Is”
Hegel in the introduction §17 to his Encyclopaedia of the Philosophical Sciences ob-
serves that one of the most difficult problems for a philosophical investigation is 
the question of where to begin (Hegel 1991, 41). Indeed, early in the Western nar-
rative, thinking about the order of things began with ontological questions such 
as “What kinds of things are there?” and “What is the nature (physis) of things?”. 
One reason for the irrelevance of this kind of ontology for Confucian metaphys-
ics is reflected in the classical Chinese language itself. Since the classical Chinese 
does not employ a copulative verb that connotes “existence” as essential being per 
se, the Chinese terms usually used to stand in for and translate the alien notions 
of “being” and “not-being” have been you 有 and wu 無. But in fact, you does not 
mean that something “is” (esse in Latin) in the sense that it exists in some essential 
way; it means rather “having present-to-hand” or “to be around”. On the bronzes, 
you is depicted as the right hand holding sacrificial meat that is to be shared: . 
“To be” is thus “to be available”, “to be around, and to have to share”. Likewise, wu 
does not mean “to not be”, but rather means “to not be around, to not be availa-
ble”. The sense of “being” as expressed in the classical Chinese language overlaps 
with “having”, disposing those who would employ the notions of you and wu to 
concern themselves with the presence or absence of concrete particular things and 
the effects of having or not having them at hand. You and wu thus describe the 
growth or diminution of eventful relations among things rather than essences that 
individuate discrete and independent things. In the classical Chinese language 
with the central importance it invests in analogical and correlative thinking, the 
correlation of presumed relationships to do the work of the copula has led Chris 
Fraser to propose the hypothesis that “the concept of similarity or sameness plays 
a theoretical role for classical Chinese theorists analogous to that of to be or the 
copula in European languages” (Fraser 2012, 13–14). Even in recent centuries, 
when the translating of Indo-European cultures required the Chinese language to 
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designate a term to do the work of the copula, the choice was the pronoun shi 是, 
meaning “this”, indicating relational proximity and immediate availability rather 
than “existence” per se.
Why would the ultimate mystery of being per se—that is, the question of “Why 
is there something rather than nothing?”—not arise in classical Confucian met-
aphysics? The answer simply put is because “only becoming is”. For Confucian 
metaphysics, there is no “being” and “not-being” dualism that would allow for 
the isolating of the determinate and the indeterminate aspects of things made 
possible by the aseity or self-sufficiency of being per se—that is, a notion of ex-
istence that originates from and has no source other than itself. Thus, “being” 
and “not-being” are not available as possibilities that would occur to these early 
thinkers. Said the another way, because the determinate and indeterminate—you-
wu 有無—are always mutually entailing correlatives, there is no such thing as 
“not-being” as a gaping void or an absolute nothingness, and no such thing as 
“being” as something that is independently permanent and unchanging. Wu is a 
term that describes an emptiness within the bounds of determinate yet changing 
form captured in “empty” (zhong 盅) as in an empty vessel. Wu also describes an 
undulating, inchoate state of indeterminacy reflected in the term “surging” (chong 
沖): the as-yet unformed penumbra that honeycombs each of the myriad things 
and that explains the emergence of novel determinacy in the ceaseless process of 
transformation.2 You then describes a persistent yet always changing determinate 
pattern within the flux and flow of experience. We might want to describe you as 
the rhythm or cadence of change rather than as any kind of static form. 
Indeed, rather than the ontological question of “Why is there something rather 
than nothing?” we find an alternative question that arises in Confucian metaphys-
ics. As a question that sets the main thesis of cosmological texts such as the Book of 
Changes (Yijing 易經) and Focusing the Familiar (Zhongyong 中庸), we might for-
mulate it as: If only “becoming” is, how can human beings collaborate most effec-
tively with the Heavens and the Earth to get the most out of our experience and at 
the same time, produce a flourishing world?3 This assumption that “only becom-
ing is” would explain the genealogical rather than the “metaphysical” character of 
classical Chinese cosmogony, a genealogy that has neither an initial beginning nor 
any anticipated end. Such a dedicated genealogical cosmology provides a warrant 
for sinologist Gudula Linck to use the seemingly oxymoronic term “continuous 
cosmogony” (ununterbrochene Kosmogonie) in her description of it (Linck 2001). 
2 See Daodejing 4 in which the textual variants describe dao 道 itself in these terms.
3 Dewey’s pragmatism embraces a similar process cosmology, leading him to describe this ultimate 
mystery in these temporal terms: “The mystery of time is thus the existence of real individuals. ... 
The mystery is that the world is as it is—a mystery that is the source of all joy and all sorrow, of all 
hope and fear, and the source of development both creative and degenerative.” (Dewey 1998, 225)
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That is, this notion of cosmogenesis, rather than appealing for explanation to a 
creatio ex nihilo intervention from some independent and external source of order, 
references a process of “birthing” associated with the female (shi 始) that con-
tinues unabated without beginning or end. On the bronzes, the character shi 始 
is written as  indicating the breeding and reproduction of mammals. That is, 
the sense of “beginning” is shi 始—a female conception, a natal, foetal beginning 
associated with a foetus (tai 胎) that inherits a world “bequeathed” (yi 詒) to it 
and “passed on” (yi 貽) from progenitors who have come before. The language is 
pervasively genealogical and ancestral (zong 宗), including within this vocabulary 
rather vague expressions such as “lord” (di 帝) and the often anthropomorphic 
tian 天 that seem to straddle the human and the numinous realms—both ances-
tors and gods.4  
A distinct difference between a genealogical and a metaphysical cosmogony is 
that where the latter entails the intervention of some external creative source that 
establishes a “One-behind-the-Many” idealistic and teleologically driven meta-
physics, the genealogical cosmogony always entails two elements in the creative 
process that must collaborate in conception and procreation. And a second fun-
damental difference is that whereas metaphysical cosmogonies promise increased 
illumination as we move back to and understand the ultimate source, a genea-
logical cosmogony describes a birthing from an inchoate, incipient life-form that 
presupposes genealogy and progenitors rather than originative principles or di-
vine design, and a pattern of always-situated and cultivated growth in significance 
rather than the linear actualization of some predetermined potential. Hence, un-
like some traditional Western cosmogonies that usher us back to the source of an 
intelligibility that has deliberately overcome chaos and has established order, Chi-
nese natural cosmogonies direct us back to what, from our present perspective, is a 
world wherein the further back we go in the birthing canal, the more dark, amor-
phous, and remote it becomes for us. Further, the cosmogonic narrative takes us 
back to an earlier set of conditions that, requiring its own terms of understanding, 
cannot be explained by the application of our present philosophical vocabulary. As 
the cosmos changes, so must the language of its explanation.
The Primacy of Vital Relationality in Confucian Metaphysics 
While the substance ontology of early Greek metaphysics establishes a doctrine 
of external relations among discrete “things” that each have their essential integ-
rity, the processual “metaphysics” as it is expressed in the “Great Tradition” com-
mentary on the Book of Changes and as it is implicit in the early Confucian texts 
4 See the distinction between genealogical and metaphysical cosmogony in Ames 2011, 225–31.
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treats phenomena as conterminous events that are constituted by their internal 
relations. In envisioning this relational alternative to the “being” of substance on-
tology, Peter Hershock looks to a doctrine of intrinsic, constitutive relations that 
makes “objects” simply the product of a mental abstraction from lived relations. 
As Hershock observes:
... what we take to be objects existing independently of ourselves are, in 
actuality, simply a function of habitual patterns of relationships. ... This 
amounts to an ontological gestalt shift from taking independent and de-
pendent actors to be first order realities and relations among them as 
second order, to seeing relationality as first order (or ultimate) reality and 
all individual actors as (conventionally) abstracted or derived from them. 
(Hershock 2006)
What something is, what it does, and what it means for other things, are no more 
than aspects of its continuing narrative. Things are what they are because of their 
place and function in respect of the wholeness of experience. As Joseph Needham 
has observed with respect to early Chinese cosmology:
Things behaved in particular ways ... because their position in the ev-
er-moving cyclical universe was such ... If they did not behave in those 
particular ways they would lose their relational position in the whole 
(which made them what they were), and turn into something other than 
themselves. They were thus parts in existential dependence upon the 
whole world-organism. (Needham 1956, 280–81)
Thus it is that Confucian metaphysics begins in medias res—that is, from in the 
middle of things rather than at their causal beginning or teleological end—and 
it does not presume essential features or antecedent, determining principles as 
transcendent sources of order. Confucian metaphysics appeals not to some single, 
necessary, and independent source or goal that “de-realizes” our phenomenal ex-
perience, but to the project of “excelling at life” (de 德) and thereby “optimizing 
the experience of everything present-to-hand” (daode 道德) within our empirical 
experience. And it is a metaphysics only in so far as it follows from or further 
explains concrete human experience with careful observation and description of, 
and abstraction from, the existential continuum. 
Since the categories that we derive from and apply to experience are the result of 
historical processes, they are always subject to further revision and are provisional 
rather than necessary, even if we cannot imagine any other way of organizing 
the content of our lives. Further, these concepts are a mere verbalization and for-
malization that translate the much richer, more primordial lived experience—our 
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immediate feelings—and as such, can only ever be explanatory approximations 
rather than ontological categories. As each thing in our immediate experience is 
constituted by a particular, dynamic matrix of relations within “everything pres-
ent-to-hand” (wanwu 萬物 or wanyou 萬有), the starting point of this Confucian 
metaphysics, then, is the primacy of felt, vital relationality. 
It is because the practical function of Confucian metaphysics is to produce addi-
tional significance in the growth of meaningful relations rather than to search for 
meaning provided by the discovery of origins or ends that the best designation 
for the most general “science” of order in the Confucian tradition might be the 
ars contextualis described above as “the art of contextualizing”. Confucian thinkers 
sought to understand order as a participatory process requiring the artful coordi-
nation and disposition of things. The art of contextualizing seeks to understand 
and appreciate the manner in which particular things present-to-hand are, or may 
be, most harmoniously correlated to optimize their creative possibilities in the 
totality of the lived effect. Classical Confucian thinkers located the energy of 
this transformative process within a world that is ziran 自然—autogenerative, 
or literally “self-so-ing”—and found the more or less harmonious relations that 
constitute the particular things around them to be the natural condition of things. 
Such things require no appeal to an external ordering principle or agency for ex-
planation, and are available to human beings, the most outstanding of whom serve 
as co-creators within this dynamic cosmos, and who participate fully in the cor-
relating and coordinating of all things to make the most of our lived experience.
With this brief account of the Confucian side of the looking-glass in hand, and 
encouraged by Yu Jiyuan’s distinction between Aristotelian metaphysics and a 
contemporary understanding of metaphysics “with ambiguous edges”, I want to 
turn in the second part of this paper to a perceived distinction between ontolog-
ically determined “human beings” and the cultivation of relationally determined 
“human becomings”. Indeed, the reward for having the courage to use the word 
“metaphysics” for Confucian philosophy is that it gives us license to be bold in our 
stride and grand in our conjectures. 
Aristotle before Hegel was also concerned about where the philosophical investi-
gation begins. And in looking for this beginning, he took “What is a person?” as 
his very first question. That is, Aristotle’s Categories is the first text of the Organon 
in the standard Corpus Aristotelicum. And Aristotle’s initial project in the Categories 
is to identify the set of questions that must be asked to give a full account of what 
can be predicated of a subject, with his own concrete example of this subject being 
“the man in the market-place”. In the several different versions of these categories 
found throughout his corpus, “What is a man?” is not only his first question, but is 
also his primary one. Its primacy lies in the fact that, in Aristotle’s answer to this 
question, he introduces an ontological disparity by first identifying the necessary 
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essence or substance of the subject (Gk. ousia, L. substantia)—“What ‘is’ a man?” 
followed then by questions that distinguish this person’s various secondary and 
contingent attributes: “What is ‘in’ a man?” Aristotle explains this ontological dis-
tinction between substance and attribute in the following terms: 
To give a rough idea, examples of substance are man, horse; of quanti-
ty: four-foot, five-foot; of qualification: white, grammatical; of a relative: 
double, half, larger; of where: in the Lyceum, in the market-place; of 
when: yesterday, last-year; of being-in-a-position: is-lying, is-sitting; of 
having: has-shoes-on, has-armour-on; of doing: cutting, burning; of be-
ing-affected: being-cut, being-burned. (Aristotle 1984, 1a25–2b4)
For Aristotle, the “What?” question has primacy because it provides us with 
the essential subject: that is, what identifies the underlying substance of what 
the man is. The various other questions that are prompted by the remaining 
secondary conditions—quantity, quality, relation, place, time, position, state, ac-
tion, and affection—seek to provide us with the full complement of attributes 
that are “in” a subject or can be said “of ” a subject as contingent and conditional 
predicates, none of which can exist without supervening on this subject. In Ar-
istotle’s own language:
All the other things are either said of the primary substances as subjects 
or in them as subjects. ... So if the primary substances did not exist it 
would be impossible for any of the other things to exist. (Aristotle 1984, 
2a35–2b5-6) 
It is interesting and important to note that Aristotle’s set of questions does not 
include “How?” or “Why?” because his substance ontology has causal and teleo-
logical entailments that already answer such questions. Aristotle thus assumes a 
complete propositional description does not require further explanation, an as-
sumption that we will see is untenable in Chinese process cosmology where the 
first questions are going to be “Whence?” and “Whither?”—what are the shared 
narratives of persons and where are they going?
In reflecting on Aristotle’s strategy for a complete description and what it reveals 
about his categories, Graham observes:
Aristotle’s procedure is to isolate one thing from others, treating even 
transitive verbs (“cuts”, “burns”) as objectless, and even the relative (“half ”, 
“bigger”) as not relating two things but said of one with reference to the 
other (Graham 1990, 380). 
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We can say of the man in the market-place that “he-burns” or “he-cuts” as a pred-
icate without need of stipulating the object of this action, and we can say “he-
is-bigger” as a characteristic of him in reference to a second person rather than 
describing a relationship between the two.
Graham reflects on the extent to which this substance ontology individuates 
and decontextualizes the man by locating his potentialities as residing essentially 
within him: 
Aristotle’s thinking is noun-centered; he starts with the substance iden-
tified as man, and before introducing any verb but “to be” can already ask 
“When was he in the market-place?” and “Where was he yesterday?” but 
not “Whence?” or “Whither?” (Graham 1990, 391)
Aristotle’s ontology allows for a notion of simple location and of discrete individ-
uality, and favours the noun form grammatically—the “man” in the marketplace—
as the ground for the attributes that can then be ascribed to him. Importantly, 
the potential of the man’s formal essence and his final telos as a man makes the 
explanatory questions of “Whence?” and “Whither?” moot.
In his work on social ontology, David Weissman describes Aristotle as asserting 
the kind of discrete identity that makes us into individuals and is the basis of ex-
ternal rather than internal relations:
Things that have matter and form—primary substance—are freestand-
ing. Each is self-sufficient ... Aristotle would have us believe that a 
thing’s relations to other things—including spatial, temporal, and causal 
relations—are incidental to its identity. He reasoned that identity is es-
tablished by form, so that relations to other things many only support, 
somewhat disguise, or threaten the thing. (Weissman 2000, 95) 
One of the corollaries of an Aristotelian substance ontology that gives privilege to 
such an isolated, individual subject is the experience of the world as being popu-
lated by discrete things or objects, that “object” to us in standing off independent 
of us. And a second corollary of this ontology is the doctrine of external relations 
it assumes: that is, it construes these various independent objects each with its 
own essential integrity as first-order, discrete things—what they really are—and 
then any relations that might conjoin them as only second-order, contingent rela-
tions that they subsequently contract. 
In the Confucian canons, by contrast, “human becomings” is necessarily plural 
in that if there is only one person, there are no persons. We need each other to 
become who we will be. And beyond each other, we are also taken to be integral 
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to and have a reflexive relationship within the creative cosmic process, and cannot 
extricate ourselves from it. It is the imminent, inchoate, and thus underdetermined 
penumbra of the emerging cosmic order that provides the opening and opportu-
nity for those cultivated human “becomings” who in the process of becoming 
exemplary in their own persons collaborate symbiotically with the Heavens and 
Earth to be co-creators in achieving a flourishing world. Moreover, through the 
reflexive internalization and consolidation of this virtuosic conduct in their own 
persons, the entire cosmos becomes implicated in them in the process of them be-
coming consummately who they are. This is what the Mencius means when it says: 
孟子曰：「萬物皆備於我矣。反身而誠，樂莫大焉。強恕而行，
求仁莫近焉。」
Mengzi said, “Is there any enjoyment greater than, with the myriad 
events of the world all implicated here in me, to turn personally inward 
and to achieve resolve (cheng 誠). Is there any way of seeking to become 
consummate in my person more immediate than making every effort to 
put myself in the place of others.” (7A4)
In this passage, everything in the world is drawn into, implicated in, and brought 
into focus as one’s habitual dispositions, making one “most intensive” (zhigang 至
剛) in one’s resolve. And these focused habits of conduct then extend outward 
through putting oneself in the place of other things, making one “most extensive” 
(zhida 至大) in one’s reach and influence. Such is the result of nourishing one’s 
“flood-like qi” (haoranzhiqi 浩然之氣).5
Indeed, the capacity of exemplary persons, through personal cultivation and an 
achieved inner intensity and resolve, to produce increased significance in all of 
the relations that constitute them and their world is illustrative of the Confu-
cian assumption that creativity is always embedded and situated as creatio in situ. 
Given that Confucian morality is nothing more or less than deliberate growth in 
relations, these exemplars are thus able to achieve cosmic stature as a continuing 
source of moral meaning in their increasingly intimate relationship with their 
world. That is, any sense of the remoteness and externality of the cosmos gives 
way to an awareness of an increasingly mutual and indeed social coalescence with 
this world that is supported by feelings of deference, belonging, and trust.6 It is 
5 See also Mencius 2A2.
6 It is this sense of the inseparability of the human and the natural worlds that is inspiring the 
contemporary movement in the social sciences and humanities to herald an Antropocene epoch by 
challenging the nature/social dualism and embracing nature as a social category (see Gisli Palsson 
et al. 2013). 
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only through transforming the tianren 天人 correlative relationship into one of 
sociality and indeed of an evolving religiousness that these exemplary persons can 
make this profound difference. Such achieved harmony and clear resolution in our 
relationships is the very root from which the flourishing world order emerges, and 
contributes to the life force that guides it forward on its proper course. It is the 
human sense of felt worth and belonging within this dynamic cosmic life force 
that gives Confucian philosophy its profound religious significance.
I have suggested that metaphysics in the Confucian tradition might be best 
understood as “experience in broadest perspective”, or perhaps more specifically, 
as “knowing one’s way around the myriad things”. In any case, it invariably in-
cludes both the human perspective and the human aspiration to live a consum-
mate life. And the starting point for a philosophical investigation of this human 
experience must be the primacy of vital relations. Yu Jiyuan has challenged us 
to retrofit the term “metaphysics” in a way that will make it relevant to classical 
Confucian philosophy. I think the distinction between an Aristotelian “human 
being” and Confucian “human becomings” as a result of this challenge, can serve 
us well.
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